

440000




## A CRITICAL INTERPRETATION OF MODERN LOGIC

SUBMITTED IN COMPETITION FOR

THE KENAN FELLOWSHIP

APRIL 7, 1934

CONVERE JONES BURWELL



## PREFATORY NOTE

This paper has grown so directly from the content and process of Horace Williams' Modern Logic that I have in places reproduced even his phraseology. The material is almost exclusively from Williams' book, and I shall not deem it necessary to footnote the innumerable passages that contain his ideas, nor to inclose in quotation marks his phrases. This paper is entirely my own interpretation, criticism, and appreciation of Williams' book. To the author, I am indebted for an exceedingly thought-provoking study. To the stimulation of Modern Logic, I attribute what worth these pages may have.

## PRIMATOHY HOLES

of Horses Williams' Nosice that I have in placed reproduced over the phraseology. The material is almost exclusively fixed illiams! The and I shall not east to recessary to footnote the inturerable presented that contain his ideas, now to inclose in quartion mand wis thresh. This paper is entirely my own intermetation, entireism, who approise of Williams! book. To the action, I satisfied in an erwedictive analysis provoking study.

These pages say are e.

This paper has grown so directly from the contint out process

Horace Williams is an eminent logician of today; in his books,

The Evolution of Logic and Modern Logic, he follows the idealistic tradition;
in his methods and his ideas, he is a disciple of Hegel. He presents Hegelian
logic in the terms of twentieth century experience; the real object of logic
is to glean reality from experience. In order to fulfill this object, Williams
presents life in terms of Hegelian logic - in terms of modern thought. The
method is adapted to this progressive civilization; it exhibits the movement,
the process which is typical of, life today. Expressed in Modern Logic and
interpreted in everyday experience and in the history of thought, this Hegelian
system is pertinent to modern civilization.

The reality of Horace Williams' Modern Logic is in the process. The value of this reality is its meaning for life. The reality is in process and it cannot be exhibited in summary nor by quotation; it can be found only through thinking - through relating the quality and the quantity of the process into absolute synthesis - into the unity that is in structure difference - the truth. Truth may not be glimpsed from Williams' pages; it comes only through the individual thinking process; it comes only through synthesis in the individual mind. It is only by practice in reflecting that we may become reflective, and it is only by practice in logic that we may become logical. Thinking is the basis of the process which is aufgehoben, which by necessity exhibits unity. Does this book make us think? Does it stimulate that process that supplies its own raw It does. Modern Logic may instigate material and consumes its own children? the process of the real individual. Thinking is the grund of all life, and the object of life is to see reality as the self - to see the self as the process. Thinking is, therefore, the grund of that process by which the self is realized. The test of intelligence is dife, and the test of this book which exhibits the process of intelligence is its meaning for life.

<sup>(1)</sup> Columbia Associates in Philosophy, An Introduction to Reflective Thinking, New York, 1923, p 324

Horsee Williams is an entrent logician of today; in his books,

Ine Evolution of Logic and modern logic, he follows the idenlistic tredition;
in his methods and his ideas, he is a disciple of Begel. We precents Depolitus

logic in the terms of them tieth century experience; the real object of logic
is to glean reality from experience. In order to foldful the object, tilliams
presents life in terms of Hegelian logic - in terms of modern trouble. Fre
method is adapted to whis prepressive civiliarming it origins the movement,
the precess which is typica. If if today. Toprosed in other to here of the today.

The precess which is typica. If if today.

The precess which is typica. If if today.

The precess which is typica. If if the bissacy of them it. Easier

The reliably of sursectificas inches and as is a contrare. raine of this resultsy is its errading for 1990. The telling in the areas and to cannot be explicated in exclusive successful for all all all forms on a time of vini sanco, e estre i più de e cue imi viillange oft mait, let abvorat 🗕 zalifaid absolute sinicaris — i si i i mitti turt iz id atametus i i islama — i ie kie Truch may not be ruthmos from (it likeles though its class only from the of the 1888. That we wish the east on a guidants when a successing the east of the east of the second and the s the order to work the effication of the market bear the work of the contract o or in the street of the contract of the contra of the process while is allegiabet, which by modes to which be access. book make us this. . And I have I have I have a green as the order in sometimes the coninterpretable to the second the process of the the the time of and the engineers of the first inkin i... temefore, tem parte continue i vent the fact of investigation is different to the and the programme of an application in the contract of

It is not alone what Williams says, nor how he says it, nor why; it is the totality of the process - the reality of relation of the form and the content that is worthwhile. He exhibits, in the book, a plan for living - a plan that is begun, continued, and ended in thinking. The individual must find himself as spirit through thinking, in thinking, and of thinking. He must transcend himself, as self, in exhibiting the universal, and yet must maintain his individuality.

What is it within the book that serves as an impetus for self realization, for finding a plan for living? It is not merely what the book says; it is rather what it arouses - thought. How does this book arouse thought - that action of the mind which once in process within the finite mind, by its very nature, seeks the infinite? How can individuality transcend itself and yet maintain its identity within its delf? This is the problem of living - that problem that has animated the thinking of Anaxagoras, of the Eleatics, of Socrates, of Kant, of Hegel, of Bergson, of Williams - the problem that is constantly pricking great minds today. What does this book do to help solve the problem? It seeks to make us see life in terms of logic by exhibiting logic in terms of life. What can this process make of the individual? Can it create the individual who can solve the problem of living? It may create a thinker - a unit of civilization, an individual of principle, an individual of spirit. The process begins and ends in absolute thought.

If one is to find himself within the process, he must liken himself his life - to the process; he must feel his life process aufgehoben, must realize
the reality of relation - he must feel the necessity of making the standards of
the process his own. If I, as an individual, find myself thinking in the
process of Williams' book and develop into a creative unit, I shall realize my
own necessity, power, and possibility as relation. I shall as a unit be both
moglichkeit and wirklichkeit; I shall be maintaining my identity under all
circumstances, be an individual of character. If at the same time, I lose

It is not alone what dillians says, nor how he says is, nor aby; it is the totality of the process - the reality of relation of the form and the content that is worthwhile. We exhibits, it the book, a plan for living - a plan that is begun, continued, and ended in thinking. We inflying must find himself as spirit through thinking, in thinking, and of timber. We must transcend himself, as self, in exhibiting the universal, we possed maintain his individuality.

What is it within the book that porvious and important for cold residential, for finding a plan for living? It is not now that the book incomes a congretion of the mind which ones if process within the living a mind which ones if process within the mind, by the very nature, socks the infinite? How can interdevelop than condition in the infinite of low can interdevelop that the living the first feet in the standard of the living that the living within the infentity within its selff. In it is no produce of the infention of the living that the book of the living the living of the living of the living of the living the first one stantify principle growth minds today. In these this book is to be said at the problem? It socks to each the manage to the living of the tends of life. The principle of the problem of the living of the living of the living of the life. The process below the problem of the living of the living

If one is to consider the constant of the cons

myself in the process, I shall be a conscious unit of loyalty and service to some cause. I shall exhibit reality through the truth of relation. As a unit of truth - an ultimate unit of life, I must exhibit the universal in living. I must be the particular between the individual as subjective and the individual as universal - and in this relation as active I must express a threefold activity of knowing, loving, and doing. In expressing this threefold activity, I am an individual of spirit, of religion, of love. As an individual in love, I may transcend myself as self and respond to the absolute synthesis of the universal and absolute. If I do so, I find the answer to the problem of living. It is found through thinking - found to be of thinking and found as the thesis for thinking. "Cogito ergo sum!" If this Cartesian phrase is interpreted in the Hegelian sense, it must mean, "I think, therefore I am becoming." It is then expressive of the realization process. As an individual, I may realize myself in the process of Hegelian logic, if I liken life to this process.

If the individual finds himself in the life process, he must see life as a whole in the process of being <u>aufgehoben</u>; he must scrutinize carefully the process <u>aufgehoben</u>, must comprehend and feel its complete concreteness and must differentiate quality from quantity. Most important of all, he must value the power of relation, he must feel its dynamic quality which is its true worth. Life is by nature dialectical; it is structurally contradictory. Without recognition of the <u>begriff</u>, it is a limp, abstract process that falls apart; with recognition of the <u>begriff</u>, it is a concrete, absorbing, creating, uplifting, integrating process - an organic unity that has its ultimate reality in difference. It is only through recognition of the power of relation in the <u>begriff</u> that life has power and value. There is no aspect of Williams' logic which I found so vital as dynamic relation. It is the coercive, attractive, absorbing category that perpetuates the system.

Is the individual real? Is the universal real? Neither without the particular. The reality of the universal lies in its expression through the

f truth - an ultimate unit of life, I must exhibit the imiverse; in tiring I ust be the perticular between the individual of subjective and the individual s universal - and in this relation as solivo I must empress a tames believely by f knowing, lowing, and coing. In expressing this threafful activity, including a individual of spirit, of religion, of two. I's on individual to love, a second Inarevie. of the stop. We shad to did of brower ban flee at fleen mesense ad absolute. If I lo so, I find the caswer to the arcider a livins. It is ound through thinking - Poran to be of thirdig and I and to be thesis for hinking. "Cogito erro s.p.!" "f i is lorvesian viras is intermeted in the egolian sense, it mush mount, if think, increfore for occernize." It is then n the process of fereliam cgir, it "like Mere to wis process. office of the engal operation in the original density is also also as a contract of the contra a a williano limidomo. Como od postogram trico de aces un art mi olo ma a าง และการเลาตาวรับ (การการคราย) และ การนำแหล่ง และ ก็สาราชกาสเลย จากสามารถ<u>าวจัด สารใช้ คือ</u>ย่าง และ การการการการ Properties quality for our of a first our of piles of enteriors ower of molection, is the feet iteration of the incident in the ferm which a by mich are distanced to the street of a second of the s Dishe beggiff, is it is the first of meses that it is come if a compared the P to beariff, is in concentre, absencing a sting uplified in a cure ವಿದ್ಯ .- ಇದ್ದಾರ ಕರ್ಕ್ ಇತ್ತಿದ್ದ ಚಿಕ್ಕಾಗಿಕೊಂಡಿ ತಿರ್ಮಾರ್ ಮಾರ್ಡ ಕಾರಾ ಕಾರ್ಯ and the rest of the second of ower and value. There is no amount of William this formation of the second of the seco

yself in the process, I shall be a conscious unit of layalty and service to

ome cause. I shall exhibit reality through the truth of relation. Lo a unit

The rest of the real political results of the resul

· The off set with a

in the state of th

individual; the reality of the individual is the manifestation of the universal. The individual is real as character through identity in difference - through maintaining identity of self as a mean between the subjective and the universal. As the individual is able to maintain his identity, he sees himself in terms of ultimate reality. This is ambition - the challenge of the above self to the self, the striving of the finite to become infinite. The individual, through dynamic relations, feels himself in and of the process; the power is moglichkeit and he ever strives upward. The dynamic individual is a creative unit that can accept no limits. He is reality as relation; and this relation is worldwide. As the individual becomes conscious of the presence of this reality, this relation in his experience, he is religious. Religion is a deepening process - the cause and effect - the source of deeper consciousness of the vital power of reality. One who is within his religious experience, finds this reality and possesses faith, as Paul termed it. The individual is now an ultimate unit of reality - the source of institutions. Consciousness of this reality of the self, becomes the steadying purpose of history. Civilization, rooted and grounded in the institution, is conscious of itself, its history. History has its existence in the individual of spirit. Spirit is the culmination of the process - it is reality absolute .- it is the source of activity the power within itself to complete and stimulate itself. And how has the individual become spirit? Through the reality of relation and that reality of relation is the particular. It is in this sense that the reality of the individual and of the universal depends upon the particular. Intelligence is latent; in its expression through the individual and universal in relation, it is kinetic. Life in each moment of the process is relation. Without the negative of every positive, there could be no reality. Without the synthesizing process of life there could be no dialectic; without the struggle there could be no process in which the individual seeks to solve the problem of living. Without the outcome of the dialectic in the individual of spirit, there could be no

individual; the reality of the individual is the manifestation of tear of verter. The individual is real as character through identify in . Therence - shrough maintaining identity of salf as a menn between the anisotion and the arrange. As the individual is able we caintain 'is listliy, he so a simulaif in terms of ultimate reality. This is nobition - the conflatge of the moor self to . e self, the striving of the finite to prooms infinite. The individual, a new many dynamic relations, floats himself in and of the errosens; the power is the function and he even strives upword. The open in individual is a errorsime anti ware - o if to halve, but by a differ on till on the winter or the control of wide. In their selference consists a presence of this results. this relation in all experience, he has coligious. (citator is a legre in ... process - the ender and extent - the source of the an actinious contributed with 1 power of reliate, the a o is within is resided assessed, being the reality and possesse thit), is and trunk it. . . Individual to now ar alivimate unit of monity - the servee of institutions. See without and the reality of the bolf, wearmenths absorption movern or istor. In the total rooted and grounded in the lestitution, it is a misses of it. . . is the History had its extracted to the initial of the initial of the initial of the contract of the tion of the process - it is getting mass the. - it is a fit of our of the the power with the class a majority at a second of the contract of the contrac vicual become a inite formation and a continuation of the life is the control of the second page strate Interview of to has Lawliv latency in the empression of the contraction of the state of the property of the is a first and in the transfer of the contract of the few sould misonife to be in the first that the The control of the cont . The control of the ultimate unit of reality - no individual to be related to the universal.

Without relation there is no knowledge - no institution - no faith - no civilization. Without relation there is no reality of life.

Theoretically, it is true that relation is the heart of the organic structure of life. Practically, is relation so essential a part of the process as it is a part of the logic of Williams' book? Quite as essential! The individual as individual has no reality within himself; it is only as a part of the unity, as the one in relation to the many, that he has power. Does the monastic hermit exert as pervading an influence as the social welfare worker? Does the man without a party provide as much competition for the Democrats as the leader of the Republicans? Indeed no; in every walk of life, power is the effect and the cause of relation. Williams' logic of philosophy, of the particular, and of relation, all issues in the individual as the ultimate reality. Therefore, the logical process exhibiting life grounded in the process of the particular, is of the utmost significance as a guide for the individual, as a plan for living. All life is absorbed into and created into the logic of Christianity, for religion is grounded in the ultimate I, which is in turn grounded in the begriff. Christianity is the synthetic process which the real I manifests, the I which could not be real without relation, for the process of relation is a process of self-realization.

It is difficult to speak of the method of Williams' Modern Logic it is the reality, and has its truth in the unity of structure difference. The
form and content have no reality when they are separated; the system is valuable
within itself. It is a natural system which follows the life process; the value
lies in the content and in the form, as the active principle. There is no
emphasis upon the structure of the process. It is real and by necessity exhibits
itself as the ideas are unfolded within the material. The process has its reality
within its other - in einem Anderem. The material has its reality in the
process. There is a reciprocal relation, as each finds its being in its other.

ultimate unit of reality - no insividual to be related to the universal.
Without relation there is no knowledge - no institution - no faith - n of siltzation. Without relation there is no reality of life.

'Macrotically, it is true that relution is to heart of the ormaid structure of life. Practically, is relation so er ential a rent of the process. as it is a part of the logic of willisms' book? Stite as excerts? individual as the charles no nealth within birth; it is call we are near individual. of the unity, as the one in relation to the rany, that he has retem. I came to monestic herait exert as pervading so influence as the scelol seafare runder? Does the men without a mert, provide a much commetition for the perceptive as the leader of the Republicans? Indeed not is energy mally at life, power is to effect and two cruze of relation. Will Lat lose on this occopy, of the particular, and of relation, our tasser to the instruct of our courties as the Therefore, the logical provess caribility life wordward in a moodas of . . . particular, is of the utmost significance as a mide for in fitting, . . . plan for liting. Ill life is allowed into and a need for order to receive Christianity, for religion is givinded in its litrate i, which is in turn from a delive derece billo brong out at white Heliatid. . Thinged a. war bounding I manifesty, the india would not be madeful cut with the for the cut of of r lation is a croceca of self ref instine

It is first wit to enough of the decide of this end through form -

it is the reality, and its much in the miny of street me suiterence.

form and content lave no scality when they are secretary and suiter. It is any and suit your seconds of the secretary of the second of the sec

The intensity has its reality in the extensity. The quality finds expression in the extent denoted.

In contrast is formal logic. This is a forced process - an artificial structure superimposed upon the material - a structure so designed as to coerce facts into an intelligible form. The form does not proceed from the nature of the content; there is no power of the reality of relation which of necessity demands synthesis of structure difference into truth. Asistotelian logic loses the reality of relation; for instance, the two terms intension and extension are discussed in H.B. Joseph's An Introduction to Logic. They are defined clearly and accurately; but they are isolated from each other in the interpretation which formal logic gives; the meaning of one is not contingent upon the meaning of the other. The system does not provide that one division of the logic should find its being within another. Letters as symbols are used to represent variants in quality, quantity, modality and relation. The result is a system of insulated parts. The phenoma which these letters represent could hardly be so insulated from one another as the letters indicate. The material of logic is what thinking has already accomplished; therefore, it is particularly significant that Hegelian logic should find itself within the history of thought - should be concretely expressed in the story of philosophy. Formal logic permits that das Anders, in which is found the reality of the system be subducted from the system. Examples are given to clarify the intricacies and to exhibit the use of the terms; otherwise, material of thought has no essential role in Aristotelian logic. It is the problem of logic to show the interrelation of all stages of intelligence, to regard thought as organic and to see no step as complete without (2)its other. It would be difficult to justify this problem in formal logic. The

<sup>(1)</sup> Joseph, H.W.B., An Introduction to Logic, Oxford, 1916 pp 136-158

<sup>(2)</sup> Creighton, J.E. An Introductory Logic, London, 1930 p 34

It is interesting to note that Creighton was an ardent Hegelian. In this book, however, he presents Aristotelian logic. He considered the formal process exceedingly valuable for mental discipline and for testing knowledge; but he realized that the Hegelian process was of greater worth for individual realization.

The intensity has its reality in the extensity. The quality finds expression in the extent denoted.

In centrast is formel logic. This is a forced trocess - am artifi-

cial structure superimposed upon the material - a structure so designed at the source facts into an intelligible form. The form does not proceed from the nature of the content; there is no power of the reality of relation which of secessity demands synthesis of structure difference theo trut. Alletobelies

logic loses the reality of relation; for instance, the two temps in ension and artension are discussed in W.E. Jose, his An Introduction to sorie. efined clearly and scouratel,; but they are isclate. from each other in the interpretation which formel logic gives; where the log of or a tenderalise of upon the meaning of the other. The system fles but movife trate are division. ner on. alouant as and tell medicular mility gale stillada bloods organisms. corpresent variants in quality, quantity, rodelity as relation. He seed if meday of insulated parts. The phenome butter, by acclaraters represent on a markly be o insulated from one sother has the leavens in irros. The rate int of Lorent La hat thinking has already recomplished; the whire, it is no partice intro. eart that Regalian laying should fith. Tesaif with the listor, of the side - this e concretely expressed in the elemy of pathology;. Particle of the form es Anders, in which is found the reasing of the read to the about of a time and the state of t of the terms; contermise, meteorical of thought has no sented a total in wiriting a ogic. It is well emphises of a gic to show the interpolation of all ntellingence, to regard to a it is earn and an ite red to a them in the ි අතුර වේ. සැලි සුදු වේස්සු සුව සැලි සුම් වේ. වෙස්ම් මෙන කිරීම සිට ta of lett.

(1) Joseph, J. J., S., A. Marrish ability of Light Control of Co

a) Choirbon, T. . An I two supervises, where July . The Fig. 1 of the control of

his back, oweres, he research states of the sector of the

procedure of applying the system to a problem is artificial and stereotyped;
it in no way realizes the dynamic qualities of material nor of the process. J.E.
Creighton in An Introductory to Logic termed thinking a process of conservation
as well as of transformation - implying that formal logic demands that the
entire case be stated within the major and minor premises and that it be restated
in the conclusion; Hegelian logic would, in an analogous statement, term thinking
a process of absorption as well as of creation. Truth is not the natural outcome
of the formal process; it is the end in view - not the cause and effect. Aristotelian
logic stresses the form and substitutes the categories of thought for the reality
of the process - a substitution of quantity for quality. When one is substituted
for the other, the dynamic power of both disappears. The conclusion is of
premier importance in formal logic. It is not a genetic process; within the
system; the conclusion is final. Dynamic relation is of premier importance in
Hegelian logic. It is a genetic system; and each particular, as the reality of
relation, forms a new thesis. There is no finality in the Hegelian process.

The very nature of Modern Logic holds implicitly Williams' logical system. The dialectic is exhibited - not explained - the struggle is self-evident and necessary, in his development of the concept of the individual, of the particular, and of the universal. The true meaning of systhesis is found in its power to surmount contradictions, surmounting them through absorbing them.

The Hegelian triad has value as it exhibits the dialectic. The integrations and inner relations exhibit their own character. The reality is a growing process, growing through relation in the mind, which is of the process and moving in the process. The process which is aufgehoben is true because it is necessary - the process can nowhere be ended, for thinking by nature supplies its own raw material of each new thesis and consumes these theses into new syntheses. The book, as it exhibits the process of life, contains the command "go forward". It has no value, no reality in part, except as some part may show the dialectic. Its worth lies in its completeness as a guide for life. If I should wish to build a bridge

procedure of applying the system to a problem is artificial and giereotyped; it in no way realized the dynamic qualities of material nor of the process. I.I. Creighton in An Introductory to Logic terned thinking a process of conservetion as well as of transformation - implying that formed logic demands that the entire case be stated within the major and minor presises and that it be restated in the conclusion; Regelian logic would, in an analarous statement, term thin' ing a process of absorption as well as of spection. Truth is not the neture, enterne of the formal process; it is the end in view - not the educe and effect. Arinvotelin logic stresses the form and substitutes the setegories of thought for tile reality. of the process - a substitution of quantity for quality. When one is substituted for the other, the dynamic power of both disappears. The remainsion is of premier importance in formal logic. It is not a genetic encess; wit in the aystems the conclusion is final. Typesh o relation is of arestor insection Hegelian logic. It is a genevic system; And each papticular, as i.e wantt, of rolation, forms a new theels. There is no firelity in the Tagelian modeurs. The very nature of Modern (Act to holds implicitly ); liams locioni The figlection is excitited - now exclaimed - the strangle is sellevident and necessari, in its lene) rises of the supert of the britying a limit of particular, and of the retrover i. The true meaning of spaces is is found in its posser to a remount contradict one, surmanuting that it is a remount of the The legelian wriad lac volue as in excit to the enclosite. The line in our to a seed inner relations et ibit doete own obsectue. The modify is a rand process, and the contract of the contra ුදුවලදෙනු මේ දුර් නොවැනුවේ ප්රතියේ සැකිල් මෙන්නුවලදෙනුවේ දුරු මෙන්නුවේ වැන්නුවේ මේ වැන්නුවේ වැන්නුවේ මෙන්නුවේ process call nowbern be ended, for tabreing by het recholing the conjugation of of each med thecis and consume . Were single into the synthesist. exhibite the process of life, contains as and the formery . valed, no reality is ward, estable short and the store of our second in

efforce the contract and the following the specific property and specific property and the speci

from a mechano set, and should read only part of the instructions, I, perhaps, would select the correct materials, but would I relate them properly? Could I construct a frue bridge in which the pieces were vitally related to the entire structure? No, the book ever urging forward has no meaning if we cut short the process, if we break off before we find ourselves in and of the process. In each step, one feels the nature of the process which is aufgehoben. One gains understanding through feeling. There is a vivid example of the character of the triad in Williams' discussion of the logic of Paul, Origen and Athanasius. Paul revealed the reality of the individual through faith - quality. Origen quantitated this quality, finding the reality in thinking; Athanasius found the synthesis the spirit - the begriff - the power of relation, the reality of the dynamic, in the expression of quality in quantity and quantity in quality. This process is typical of the progress of thought. This triad is but one moment in the onward march; and on and on it goes, for "truth is inhibiting to intelligence". Intelligence will not allow itself to be inhibited by truth - it is by nature constantly going forward, upward, outward. In the words of Hegel, truth is by nature progressively realizing the reign of God.

Intelligence, in its onward march, seems blocked by the structure of our own sensory processes, for the senses report perception; and material perception is reality. Why is intelligence not blocked? Because thinking exhibits the dialectic the struggle of life, because thinking reveals contradiction as the basis of life. There can be no meaning in thinking if there is not the contradiction of the senses.

Williams has shown the process not only as illustrative of the progress of thought - not only as indicative of the necessary movement of thought within the process, but also significant in the dialectic quality of life. For example, the ancient Greeks began with the problem of unity, Thales grasped that fundamental conception. Each thinker that followed Thales has contributed some new phase of philosophy - generally conceived through antagonism to extant ideas or formulated as a conscious effort to reconcile conflicting ideas. Empedocles sought to hold on

from a mechano set, and should read only part of the instructions, I, perhaps, would select the correct materials, but would I relate them properly? Could I construct a frue bridge in which the pieces were vitally related to the entire structure? No, the book evel arging forward has no meaning if we cut short the process, if we break off before we find ourselves in and of the process. In each step, one feels the nature of the process which is sufgeholon. The aging "nderstanding through feeling. There is a vivid example of the camacter of the triad in Williams' discussion of the logic of Faul, Criger and Athanesius. Faul between the reality of the individual through failty - smallty. this quality, finding the reality in thinking; Attendating found the statements the spirit - the begriff - the power of relation, the reality of the dynamic, in the expression of quality in nauntity and punntity in quality. This provess is typical of the progress of thought. If is tried is but one ement in one onward march; and on and on it goes, for "truth is indolting to ince itersee". A tellige will not allow itself to be inhibited by truth - it is by nother compicating grips forward, upward, outward. In the words of Hegel, truth it by mile of the representation realisant too refer o were

Intelliseren, in its order nearth, seem blocked to stitutione of orm own seasony processes, for the season reach percentions, and interior corresponding to the continue. They can be intellible, because this decided to season to the control of the

of thour, t = now only reflective of the leens day time as not the modess, but these small and the highest consistent and the highest lens of the same of the same of the highest lens of the same and the same of the same and the same of the same o

to both the permanence of the Eleatics and the change of Heraclitus; he absorbed these contradictory ideas and set forth a new conception. It is significant that Williams has revealed the process of thought through the progress of thought. The ultimate dialectic of the process lies in the fact that the senses report variety and thinking reports unity; it is the problem that faced Thales; it is the problem that faces us. It can be solved only through thought; if it were not so, there could be no absolute process.

The philosophy of Williams exhibits the process which is aufgehoben and it reminds one of that idea of Heraclitus that "reality is a process, a becoming."

One may envisage his kinship with Spinoza. How like unto his "sub specie aeternitatis is Williams' idea that the dogma of immortality is an effort to recognize the transcendent quality of the individual as reality. Williams' statement that love is the existence of the universal in the individual carries us back to Spinoza's "amor intellectualis dei". For Williams, the final expression of reality is beauty; the idea is closely akin to Plato's and also to Hegel's. If the individual is to find the ultimate value in the unity in action difference - the law, then he must, in keeping the law, transcend it. Is this not a Kantian and a Christian idea? The material of Williams' Modern Logic thlustrates the process - the very process which he is expounding.

The style of the author is peculiar to him - difficult indeed - intricate and at first confusing; but the more stimulating because it stings to thought. Williams uses cryptic, epigrammatic statements; he explains little. It is left to the individual mind to find the reality - the truth through relating. Therein lies the value of the style. It instigates the truth-seeking process of the individual. The unity of Modern Logic is in the difference of the parts. Each discussion has its relation to another. The reality of relation is the compass from which the reader takes his bearings; it is the lighthouse on the dangerous shore. The first reading yields little of the content of Modern Logic; gradually, as the mind stretches farther and farther, the material begins to take form as a

to both the permanence of the Electics and the change of Horselitus; so absorbed these contradictory ideas and set forth a new conception. It is significent that Williams has revealed the process of thought through the progress of thought. The ultimate dislectic of the process lies in the fact that the sames report variety and thinking reports unity; is is the problem that faced halas; it is the problem that faces us. It can be solved only through thought; if it rere not so, the could be no absolute process.

The philosophy of dillians exhibits the process who do in aggednotes on it resinds one of that idee of deraclitus that "residing is a process, a booking.

One may envisage his kinchip sith entros: "tow it a unto hi "pub specie asterminal is williams" idea that the degree of bacerbally is an effort to recognize we are desired quality of the individual as reality. "Which is state, or, that love is the existence of the universal in the individual corrier as ben't in it'real intellectuals deit. For a library, the "inch expression or reality is count; "accusted is closely usin to intellectual the unity in a closely usin the unity in a closely almost a constitution of the interval of interval of interval of the interval of the interval of the interval of interval of interval of interval of interval.

The utility of the control of the co

as the line of returned action of the contract of the contract

whole. The book first has meaning, not in part, but as a unit, because
Williams has revealed in the transitions their dynamic and necessary structure,
Through analysis, one may comprehend particular facts - but as isolated from the
organic unity, the parts have no truth. The synthesis is supreme and absorbing the struggling mind that wrestles with Williams must possess the essentially
synthetic approach to gain understanding. Synthesis that is relation and creation
through transistions of the dynamic quality is all important. Analysis is
secondary but necessary within the synthesis. It would be difficult for one
uninitiated in the ways of the Hegelian process to comprehend and feel the value
of Williams' Modern Logic. Certainly, a knowledge of Hegel is enlightening and
revealing to a reader of this book.

The real merit of Williams' method lies in the fact that his logic cannot be superimposed upon a mind and still retain its value. It must be mastered, tested, and found real and true to life by the individual mind, ere it has any meaning for that mind. If the individual finds the process valid and can identify himself with the process, he becomes an individual of principle, finds himself in and of the absolute process of reality. It is then that the method of Williams, exhibiting the nature of the process of life has true significance and worth. It becomes a guide for life. The book, interpreting Hegelian logic, is worthy of its purpose - to exhibit the true meaning of life.

Within the process of Williams' discussion, one section seems out of place with relation to the whole. Why is the section on propositions arranged unequal propositions, organic propositions, and then dynamic propositions? Is the dynamic proposition not an unequal proposition? Are not both on the level of the begriff, recognizing the structure? Are not both propositions which are based on relation? Assuming that both are seeking the relation of the individual and the universal, why should not the dynamic proposition be discussed prior to the organic proposition? The organic expresses the structure of the fact in terms

whole. The book first less no list, south of the thirty is a control of the transitions to the same is more possible of the same same and particle of the same and the straighting of the tweether first lists as the straighting of the tweether first lists as the straighting of the tweether first lists as the straighting of the same of the same is the same of the sam

The meritarians of designations of the control of t

Items a proposition of the control o

of principle, and the absolute Which comes through the organic is the concrete. Was the organic proposition placed after the proposition of identity, after the unequal proposition, and before the propositions of perception and the dynamic propositions in order to show the relation of the two groups; namely, the propositions of identity, unequal propositions, organic propositions on the one hand, and on the other, the propositions of perception, dynamic propositions and organic propositions? It is characteristic of the system that the propositions recognizing the category of relation should precede the presentation of the proposition instituted by the proposition of relation. In view of the form and content of Modern Logic, is Williams justified in arranging the propositions in this order? The process cannot permit such an inconsistency in its necessarily logical structure. Neither can it permit that the discussion of the ultimate judgment precede the discussion of the other levels of judgment out of which grows the ultimate judgment. Truth is unity in structure difference; and as truth, the ultimate judgment cannot be logically true until the difference exhibits In this instance Williams seems to proceed in a reverse direction. itself as unity. It is a counter evolutionary movement and it is not characteristic of modern logic.

And what of the individual judgment? Is there not a judgment on the level of sein and dasein? Is there not a judgment on this level which expresses recognition? Without a judgment of the individual, the value of the particular as relation is lost. The particular cannot, without the individual judgment, be tause and effect. There is no necessity - no power - no ekklasia within the particular, for it is not the reality of relation. Williams' discussion of the judgments is not consistent with the process in which truth is reality as relation. In omitting the individual judgment, Williams fails to attach his chain of thinking to a thesis. Does he not omit the thesis? Because the thesis is omitted and because the synthesis precedes the steps that procreate the synthesis, the process of judgments does not seem by nature aufgehoben. His discussion of the judgments is not convincing. Why? Because the reality of relation is not exhibited.

of principle, and the absolute wile comes through the organic is the charact. Was the organic proposition place ofter the grome . tion of the tight, color the unequal proposition, am before the propositions of percention and the dynamic propositions in order to show the relation of the two growns; makely the propositions of identity, unclust propositions, organic proceedions on the one hand, and on the objer, the emonopitions of adrengting dynchic reprositions and organic propositions? It is that obstitution of the space organic propositions er. To the datement of controls notified to the action of the controls and the controls of the control of the co content of Monorm Logic, is Williams fracilie, in asserting a correction with in this order: The grocess came, remain such to the profession of the constant or logical structura, uncither was it remains that the intermit of the structural structural structural and structural structural structural structures and structural structures and structures are structured as the structure structures and structures are structured as the structure structure structure structures are structured as the structure structure structure structures are structured as the structure structure structures are structured as the structure structure structures are structured as the structure structure structure structure structure structure structures are structured as the structure structure structure fulgrament the discrete discrete of some in the control of the second descent the second of the control of the as incorporate and the end of the corporation of the corporation of the end aworg truth, the visimate (vigrae t sauno) o usgisall, the a still to thic one-or infinite itself as unity. In this instance indicate soon to impose in a mayers in It is a counter evolutionary cover but are it in for our access it events for inadi tu nombol e primali I (tuang) Indiana (tanàn 1971) ao amin'ny faritr'i Amerikana ao amin'ny

level of sein and issein? In those not a jugant or and steed with a special recognition? If out a judgment or a individual, as a selection is lost. The perticular cannot, without a freity are judgment, because and effect. There is no medicality - a power - no ordansia within the perticular, for is is not the reality of solution. If there is no medicality of solution. In the selection of selection we are consistent with a process in which where it selection are relative to a transition of the selection of selection of the selection of selection as the contribution of the selection of the selecti

Perhaps it is not lost, but certainly it is not exhibited within the process of judgment the judgments. Aristotle would tolerate the placing of the ultimate/first.

Hegel would not, without sufficient reason. Is the author portraying the Aristotelian conception of judgment or his own conception of judgment? Perhaps the explanation is in the former.

The reality of relation must be exhibited; it is the very grund of the process - the cause and effect of the reality of Williams' book. It is essential that one does not lose the force of the process; therefore, the moments which have been discussed and questioned, if they are to be vital, must be within the process itself in such a way that they reveal the dynamic relation of reality. Without the reality of relation, the process loses power, the individual loses power - life loses power. How can the individual maintain himself and transcend himself? How can he find reality? As an ultimate unit, how can he identify himself with reality? How can man, as an individual, become part of the universal? Through relation. All may be accomplished through love - that is through exhibiting the process of relation and synthesis in living. "Love is the absolute synthesis - the consciousness of the individual that he is in and of the cosmic process." Williams exhibits the process; shall we live the process? The test of intelligence is life. Intelligence is ultimate. Philosophy stands at the beginning and at the end of the process; it is both the starter and the goal. Intelligence is the ground-work - the grund of all life. Shall we through our intelligence exhibit the process? Shall we through relating our intelligence to the absolute become ultimate? It is again the problem of living. The reality of Horace Williams' Modern Logic is in the process; all reality is in process. The value of this reality is in its meaning for life; it is a plan for living. Why? The book has the highest value as a guide to life, as a method of interpreting life, as a means by which the individual, by losing himself, may find himself an und für sich in the absolute. When the individual loses himself in Modern Logic, he finds himself as dynamic relation within the process; and in thus

<sup>(1)</sup> Williams, H.H. Modern Logic, Durham, N.C. 1927, p. 333

Perhaps it is not lost, but certainly it is not exhibit ad within the recease of judgments. Aristotle would tolerate the placing of the ultimake first.

Hegel would not, without sufficient reason. In the service contentian the sufficient reason of judgment or his own conseption of judgment or his own the september of judgment.

The reality of relation must be existing to the var grand of U.S. process - the cause and effort of the reality of dillians' buch. It is as ential that one does not lose the force of the increas; therefore, to the rain this have been discussed and questioned, if they are to be with, much be if in the process itself in such a way than they reveal the appear relation of reduction Without the reality of relation, the process loses mover, the fadity hour power - life loses nower. 'ow set the individual maliministic and transcall himself? How sem he find reshity? As an ultimese wit, or our he identify How can man, as on irdividual, become port of vie aniversal? himself with reality? ill may be accommished throw, love - that is through ea-Through relation. hibiting the process of relation and synthesis in learn. "Lone is a cosclute synthosis - the consciousness of the individual that had is in all of the course dilians oxabits the process; shall we live the riverses? The ".esecourg of intelligence is like. Intelligence is altituate. Balloconing abuses if the ginning and at the ord of the monday; it is bount to a source had like telligence is the ground-work - the many of all in optoria o ti tak ar jajer rajval or ilimi. Pasepung a vidinga pomotilletmi abilit the tobder of Mi it : the absolute become altirate? Horace williams "Towerm logge is in the rucees; of mountary is in avenue. Jo value of this reality is 'n its meaning for life; 'the war and it is a value The book has the birnest white he will be lift, but as as of instance mediag life. as a goods by w ten ten indicident, by loring elemental, music. of fleent week! waster to be a second an uni für sich in de absoluts. Logic, he finds himself as dynamic refer on within a a my class, and in this

(1) Williams, T. Modern Logic, Purpeys, ... 1927, v. 285

losing himself, he transcends himself, but in transcending himself he never gets beyond the limits of the process of Modern Logic, because the book has no limits. As a guide to life, it eternally reveals itself in every phase of living. It instigates within the individual the process of self-realization which is <u>aufgehoben</u> - that process by which the individual may build a life of which the parts are organically related and necessary to the entire structure. When one finds himself within the process, the book has true meaning, life has true worth. Does Modern Logic not stimulate a plan for living, urging ever onward, upward, and outward, insisting that "we see life steadily and see it whole"?

beyond the limits of the process of index Logic, because the book has no limits. As a guide to life, it sternally reveals itself in every phase of living. It instig tes within the individual the process of self-restitution which is sufgenoben - that process by which it individual may beild a life of which the parts are organically related and necessary to the entire case that one finds himself within the process, the book has true a lair, life has true worth. Does determ logic not stimulate a plan for living, urging ever datum.

losing himself, he transcends himself, but in transcending himself he mover gris



